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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
John Woodrow Grant appeals from his convictions for domestic battery, 
possession of methamphetamine and aggravated battery. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In case number CR 2005-10538-FE, Grant was charged with Aggravated 
Battery for shooting Tyler Solomon with a gun. (R., vol. I, pp. 87-88.) The 
evidence showed that Grant fired a loaded weapon into a crowd while involved in 
a fight and the bullets hit Solomon in the face and chest. (2006 PSI, pp. 2-4.) 
Grant pled guilty to the charge (R., vol. 1, pp. 115-16), and was sentenced to 10 
years with four years fixed and the district court retained jurisdiction (R., vol. I, 
pp. 122-24). Upon successfully completing his rider, the district court suspended 
Grant's sentence and placed him on probation for four years. (R., vol. I, pp. 126-
27.) 
Three years later, Grant was charged with possession of 
methamphetamine in case number CR 2009-19445-FE. (R., vol. II, pp. 211-12.) 
A week later, in case number CR 2009-19451-FE, he was charged with domestic 
battery, aggravated assault and unlawful possession of a firearm, for burning his 
girlfriend, Karoline Monroe's, face with a cigarette and holding a gun against her 
head. (R., vol. II, pp. 344-45.) Due to the new charges, Grant's probation officer 
filed a report of probation violation in Grant's 2005 case where he asserted that 
Grant had violated his probation by using methamphetamine and committing the 
new offenses. (R., vol. I, pp. 130-31.) 
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Prior to Grant's scheduled change of plea hearing, Grant's attorney filed a 
motion to withdraw as counsel in Grant's possession of methamphetamine case 
(CR 2009-19445-FE), arguing, inter alia, that Grant had "insisted on pursuing an 
objective that the undersigned considers imprudent and unreasonable." (R., vol. 
II, pp. 230-31.) The motion was denied after a hearing. (R., vol. II, pp. 232-33.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Grant pled guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine in case number CR 2009-19445-FE and domestic battery in 
case number CR 2009-19451-FE. (R., vol. II, pp. 256, 262-63, 378, 383-84.) In 
the methamphetamine case, Grant was sentenced to five years with two years 
fixed. (R., vol. II, pp. 271-75.) In the domestic battery case, Grant was 
sentenced to 10 years with five years fixed. (R., vol. II, pp. 396-400.) The district 
court revoked his probation in his 2005 case and ordered his sentence of ten 
years with four fixed executed. (R., vol. I, pp. 146-50.) The district court ordered 
Grant's sentences in the 2009 cases to run concurrently with each other but 
consecutive to the sentence in his 2005 case. (R., vol. I, p. 148, vol. II, pp. 272, 
397.) In sum, the district court sentenced Grant to 20 years with nine years fixed. 
Grant filed Rule 35 motions in each case (R., vol. II, pp. 402-03), which was 
denied (R., vol. II, pp. 405-06). Grant timely appealed. (R., vol. I, pp. 158-60, 
vol. II, pp. 408-10.) 
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ISSUES 
Grant states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Grant due process 
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the 
transcript of the jurisdictional review hearing? 
2. Did the district court err when it failed to grant defense 
counsel's motion to withdraw? 
3. Did the district court err when it admitted the victim's impact 
statement? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Mr. 
Grant's sentence in the 2005 case to run consecutively with the 
sentences in the 2009 cases? 
5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Grant's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence 
in light of Mr. Grant's continuing family support? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Does Grant's constitutional due process/equal protection claim fail 
because he failed to show that the requested transcript was necessary for 
appellate review of any issue presented in his case on appeal? 
2. Has Grant failed to preserve for appeal his claim that the district court 
erred in denying his attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel? 
3. Has Grant failed to show that the district court erred in admitting the victim 
impact statement in its entirety? 
4. Has Grant failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
ordering the sentence in his 2005 case to run consecutively to the sentences in 
his other cases? 
5. Has Grant failed to show that the district court abused its discretion In 




Grant Has Failed To Demonstrate That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His 
Rights To Due Process And Equal Protection By Denying His Motion To 
Augment 
A. Introduction 
The Idaho Supreme Court denied augmentation of the record in Case 
Number CR 2005-10538 with a transcript of Grant's 2006 jurisdictional review 
hearing. (Order, dated August 6, 2011.) Grant asserts that by denying his 
motion to augment, the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection because he "cannot obtain a merit based appellate review of his 
sentencing claims" and "because he cannot obtain effective assistance of 
counsel on appeal." (Appellant's brief, pp. 8, 14 (capitalization altered; 
underlining omitted).) Grant has failed to show error, however, because he has 
made no showing that the transcripts were a necessary part of the record on 
appeal. He has failed to demonstrate that absent the requested transcript, this 
Court cannot adequately review whether the district court erred when it revoked 
Grant's probation and ordered his original sentence executed or when it denied 
his Rule 35 motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Constitutional issues involving questions of law are given free review, 
State v. Casey, 125 Idaho 856,876 P.2d 138 (1994). 
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C. Grant's Due Process And Equal Protection Claims Fail Because He Failed 
To Show That The Requested Transcript Was Necessary For Appellate 
Review Of Any Issue Presented On Appeal 
A defendant in a criminal case has a due process right to "a record on 
appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged 
regarding the proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462,50 P.3d 
472, 477 (2002). However, the state "will not be required to expend its funds 
unnecessarily" to provide transcripts that "will not be germane to consideration of 
the appeal." Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495 (1963). An indigent 
defendant is entitled, at state expense, only to those transcripts and portions of 
the record necessary to pursue the issues raised on appeal. Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (trial transcript on appeal of claimed trial errors); Lane v. 
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (transcript of post conviction hearing on appeal of 
denial of relief). Thus, Grant is entitled to a transcript if it is "germane" and if no 
other method of providing a meaningful appeal is available. Draper, 372 U.S. at 
499. Grant is not entitled to a transcript based on "an abstract need or desire" 
but must instead show "a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Greenholtz v. 
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1,6 (1979) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564 (1972)). See also State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795,806,820 P.2d 
665, 676 (1991) (procedural due process issues are raised whenever a person 
risks being deprived of life, liberty or property interests because of governmental 
action); Stoneberg v. State, 106 Idaho 519, 521-522, 681 P.2d 994, 996-997 
(1984) (court first must determine whether the specific interest threatened by 
government action is within contemplation of the liberty or property language of 
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the Fourteenth Amendment). Grant is thus entitled to transcripts at state 
expense only if they are necessary to complete a record adequate for appellate 
review of an issue. State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 476 
(2002). 
Grant has failed to demonstrate that a transcript of the 2006 jurisdictional 
review hearing, at which the court suspended Grant's sentence and placed him 
on probation, is necessary to complete a record adequate for appellate review of 
the 2010 actions of the district court in revoking his probation and not reducing 
his sentence. Grant has failed to show that the jurisdictional review hearing 
transcript has any relevance to the district court's decision to revoke his 
probation. There is no evidence that the district court had the transcript or that it 
relied upon anything said at Grant's 2006 jurisdictional review hearing when it 
revoked his probation in July 2010 and denied his Rule 35 motion in September 
2010. In fact, the district court judge presiding at Grant's probation revocation 
proceeding and Rule 35 hearing was not the same judge who presided at his 
jurisdictional review hearing, making it impossible for the later judge to have 
relied upon anything said at the jurisdictional review hearing. (R., vol. I, pp. 126-
27; vol. II, pp. 396-400, 405-06.) Further, in revoking his sentence the district 
court relied, primarily, on his plea of guilty to two new felonies and the facts 
surrounding his initial aggravated assault charge, which are included in the 
record. (Tr., p. 205, L. 17 - p. 215, L. 25.) Likewise, in denying his Rule 35 
motion, the district court relied on the underlying facts in Grant's case and not 
anything that Grant mayor may not have said four years earlier at the review 
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hearing. (Tr., p. 220, L. 21 - p. 222, L. 24.) In short, Grant has failed to show 
how the transcript is relevant to the any issue arising from revocation of probation 
and the denial of his Rule 35 motion, the only issues over which this Court has 
jurisdiction on appeal. 
In State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), 
relied on by Grant, the Court of Appeals stated that appellate review of a 
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation is based 
"upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events 
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." 
(Emphasis added.) The law is well established, however, that absent a showing 
that evidence was presented at prior hearings, and/or that the district court relied 
on such evidence in reaching its decision to revoke probation, an appellant is not 
entitled to transcription at public expense of every hearing conducted between 
sentencing and the date probation was finally revoked. See Strand, 137 Idaho at 
462, 50 P.3d at 477 (quoting Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963)) 
('''[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by 
unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcripts does not mean that the 
State must waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate 
appellate review."'). Grant has simply failed to show that the transcript is 
necessary to establish or challenge any fact or event relevant to the order 
imposing the sentence after the probation violation. 
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the 
appellate record of a transcript of a prior jurisdictional review hearing to fully 
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review the revocation of probation, Grant has failed to show that any such 
circumstances apply here. There is nothing provided by Grant that would 
indicate that any transcribable statement made at the jurisdictional review 
hearing, held nearly four years before the decisions at issue on this appeal, was 
considered or played any role in the district court's decision to revoke Grant's 
probation or deny his Rule 35 motion. Grant's claim of a due process violation is 
without merit. 
Grant has also failed to establish a violation of equal protection. Grant 
cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate records 
because of their indigence. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 8-14 (citing,~, Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495 (1963); 
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the record 
that in any way indicates that Grant was denied a transcript solely because he is 
indigent. In fact, Grant's motion would have properly been denied even if he had 
the funds to pay for the transcripts. The Idaho Supreme Court's order properly 
denied the motion to augment where Grant failed to make a showing that any 
appellant - indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to augment the record as 
requested. 
The Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation to set 
forth a ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested. I.A. R. 30. Grant's 
motion to augment failed because he failed to meet this minimal burden, imposed 
upon all parties, of showing that the transcript is necessary or even helpful in 
addressing appellate issues. There is no reason to believe that the motion to 
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augment would have been granted had Grant been paying for it - the rule applies 
to all parties, not just the indigent. 
Grant has failed to show that the denial of his motion to augment was in 
any way influenced or decided by his indigence, and has therefore failed to show 
that the legal authority on which he relies is even germane. Grant has not shown 
that due process entitles him to any augmentation of the record merely because 
he has requested it, or that due process or equal protection is offended by a rule 
requiring a showing of grounds for augmentation - by any party -- before 
augmentation will be granted. 
Grant has failed to show that the requested transcripts are necessary to 
complete a record adequate to review any issue on appeal. To the contrary, the 
record amply demonstrates that Grant's motion to augment was properly denied 
because he failed to show that the transcript was necessary for adequate review 
of any issue properly before the court. Grant has failed to show his due process 
rights were implicated, much less violated by the denial of his motion to augment. 
Because Grant has failed to demonstrate that the transcripts are necessary to his 
appeal, he is not entitled to relief. 
D. Grant Has Failed To Show That The Denial Of His Motion To Augment 
Amounted To A Denial Of His Right to Effective Assistance Of Appellate 
Counsel 
Grant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). However, he has cited nothing in support of 
his proposition that his attorney provided him ineffective assistance of counsel 
because the Supreme Court denied his motion to augment the record with the 
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transcript of his 2006 jurisdictional review hearing. It is well established in Idaho 
law that an appellate court will not consider a claim of error that is not supported 
by both argument and citation to authority. State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510,518, 
164 P.3d 790, 798 (2007); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,303, 160 P.3d 739, 742 
(2007); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ('When 
issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or 
argument, they will not be considered."). Grant asks this Court to afford him 
relief but he has cited nothing showing that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
is even implicated in the Supreme Court's denial of his motion to augment. 
Because a transcript of the 2006 jurisdictional review hearing was not part of the 
record, despite his attorney's attempts to include it, his attorney cannot have 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to have reviewed it. 
Grant has failed to show that preparation of the transcript of the 2006 
jurisdictional review hearing is necessary to protect his right to due process or 
effective assistance of counsel. He has failed to show that the record as it 
currently exists is inadequate. The denial of the motion to augment with the 
transcript did not deny Grant effective assistance of counsel. 
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II. 
Grant's Claim That The District Court Erred In Denying His Attorney's Motion To 
Withdraw Was Waived By His Unconditional Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Before Grant pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine in case CR-
2009-19445-FE, his attorney moved to withdraw. (R., vol. II, pp. 230-31.) The 
district court denied the motion after a hearing. (R., vol. II, pp. 232-33.) Grant 
thereafter entered an unconditional guilty plea. (R., vol. II, pp. 254-61, 262-64.) 
Grant attempts on appeal to challenge denial of counsel's motion to withdraw. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 17-26.) This Court must decline to consider this claim 
because Grant waived it by pleading guilty. Alternatively, Grant has failed to 
show error. 
B. By Entering Into A Non-Conditional Plea Of Guilt. Grant Waived His Claim 
That The District Court Erred In Denying His Attorney's Motion To 
Withdraw 
Grant contends that the district court erred in denying his attorney's 
motion to withdraw. This issue has been waived, however, by his guilty plea. A 
guilty plea ordinarily constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects in the 
proceedings. State v. Manzanares, -- P.3d --, 2012 WL 29344 (Idaho 2012); 
State v. Kelchner, 130 Idaho 37, 39, 936 P.2d 680, 682 (1997); State v. Book, 
127 Idaho 352, 354, 900 P.2d 1363, 1365 (1995). A defendant may, with the 
agreement of the prosecution, enter a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 11 (a)(2), reserving the right to appeal specified adverse rulings of 
the trial court. Grant did not enter into such an agreement. Because this issue 
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was not reserved in Grant's plea agreement, this court should not consider the 
merits of his claim. 
C. Grant Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Discretion In Denial Of His 
Attorney's Motion To Withdraw 
Approximately one week prior to Grant's change of plea hearing, Grant's 
attorney moved to withdraw as counsel of record in the possession of 
methamphetamine case. (R., vol. II, pp. 230-31.) In his motion to withdraw, 
counsel stated that he was unable to effectively represent Grant for four reasons: 
1) Grant "insisted upon pursing an objective that the undersigned considers 
imprudent and unreasonable;" 2) Grant "had previously agreed to settle this 
matter and accept the State's offer and has now rescinded that offer," 3) Grant 
had "stated that the undersigned has not adequately and competently 
represented his interests;" and 3) "the relationship between the defendant and 
the undersigned has become adversarial and the Defendant has indicted [sic] he 
wants new counsel to advise him in this case." (R., vol. II, p. 230.) At a hearing 
on the motion, Grant's attorney further explained, "[W]e talked about doing a 
Rule 11 agreement with the State. I thought we had an agreement with the State 
to do that. Come right down to it, they would not agree to do a [binding] Rule 11 
agreement.... And then my client decided that because we couldn't do that, that 
he would not accept the plea offer." (Tr., p. 120, Ls. 11-23.) At the hearing, 
Grant agreed that he wanted new counsel. (Tr., p. 121, L. 25 - p. 122, L. 1.) 
After considering the request, the district court denied counsel's motion to 
withdraw. (Tr., p.123, L. 14-p. 124, L.14; p.124, L. 24-p.125, L.16.) 
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Grant claims on appeal that the district court failed to adequately inquire 
into the request for substitute counsel and, he asserts, the appropriate remedy is 
to remand the matter for further proceedings. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-24.) 
Grant also asserts that the district court abused its discretion because it "ignored 
defense counsel's statement that he could not communicate with Mr. Grant" and 
due to this purported error, Grant is entitled to vacation of his sentence. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 25-26 (capitalization altered; underlying omitted).) Grant's 
arguments are without merit. 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel. For indigent 
defendants this includes the right to court-appointed counsel. Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Pharris v. State, 91 Idaho 456, 458, 424 
P.2d 390, 392 (1967). The right to counsel does not necessarily mean a right to 
the attorney of one's choice. State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1058, 772 P.2d 
263, 265 (Ct. App. 1989). Mere lack of confidence in otherwise competent 
counsel is not necessarily grounds for substitute counsel in the absence of 
extraordinary circumstances. State v. McCabe, 101 Idaho 727, 729, 620 P.2d 
300, 302 (1980). The constitutional guarantees, however, do entitle a criminal 
defendant to the assistance of a reasonably competent attorney. See l.!t at 728, 
620 P.2d at 301. For good cause a trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a 
substitute attorney for an indigent defendant. I.C. § 19-856. 
In support of his contention that Grant was denied a "full and fair 
opportunity to address the court concerning his desires for substitute counsel" 
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(Appellant's brief, p. 19), Grant relies upon State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 606 
P.2d 1000 (1980), State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711,946 P.2d 1351 (Ct. App. 1997), 
and State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 181 P.3d 512 (Ct. App. 2007). However, 
each of these cases addresses the situation where a defendant requests 
substitute counsel, rather than where an attorney files a motion to withdraw. 
Although the ultimate inquiry is the same - whether there has been a breakdown 
in the attorney-client relationship sufficient to establish an abridgement of the 
right to counsel, see State v. Davis, 201 P.3d 185, 202 (Oregon 2007) - the 
procedure may be different. 
Unlike the defendants in Clayton, Peck and Lippert, Grant never filed a pro 
se motion asking for discharge of his attorney (Clayton and Peck) nor did he 
orally initiate a request substitute counsel (Lippert). Rather, Grant's attorney filed 
a motion to withdraw. Clayton only requires the district court "to afford [a] 
defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support 
of his motion for substitution of counsel." Clayton, 100 Idaho at 898, 606 P .2d 
at 1002 (emphasis added). Here, because the motion was filed by Grant's 
attorney and not by Grant, the court was not required to afford Grant a full and 
fair opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of Grant's attorney's 
motion to withdraw. The district court was only required to determine if good 
cause existed to appoint a new attorney. I.C. § 19-856. 
Because the motion to withdraw was filed by Grant's attorney, this 
situation is more analogous to that in State v. Smith,130 Idaho 450,942 P.2d 574 
(Ct. App. 1997). In Smith, Smith sent the trial court a letter explaining his 
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reasons for requesting a new attorney. 130 Idaho at 452,942 P.2d at 576. After 
receiving a copy of the letter, Smith's attorney filed a motion to withdraw. 1st. 
Smith was present at the hearing on counsel's motion to withdraw and did not 
dispute the assertions made in support of the motion. 1st. The district court 
denied Smith's attorney's motion, requiring him to remain as counsel until Smith 
made arrangements for new counsel to represent him . .lit On appeal, Smith did 
not claim that his attorney was ineffective but rather that the district court should 
have conducted a more detailed inquiry into the source of the conflict. .lit at 453, 
942 P.2d at 577. The court of appeals noted that the district court did not 
interpret Smith's letter as a motion for substitution of counsel and, thus, did not 
engage in a "good cause" analysis. 1.9.:. Ultimately, the court of appeals held: 
"having reviewed the explanation given by the public defender at the hearing on 
the motion to withdraw, and in light of the ambiguity of Smith's letter, we 
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion."1 .lit 
Like in Smith, Grant does not claim that his attorney was ineffective but 
rather simply asserts that the district court should have made a more detailed 
inquiry into his attorney's reasons for moving to withdraw. Like in Smith, Grant 
never filed a motion asking his attorney to withdraw and did not ask for substitute 
counsel on any basis other than those asserted by his attorney at the hearing on 
his attorney's motion to withdraw. Rather, like in Smith, it was Grant's attorney, 
not Grant himself, who filed the motion to withdraw. Thus, like in Smith, because 
1 The court of appeals also noted that the district court's ruling did not foreclose 
Smith the opportunity to retain private counsel. .lit 
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Grant's attorney rather than Grant filed the motion to withdraw, the district court 
did not need to afford Grant a "full and fair opportunity to present the facts" in 
support of his attorney's motion to withdraw. 
To the extent that Peck and Lippert may be applicable, Grant's reliance on 
these cases is misplaced for an additional reason. Unlike the defendants in Peck 
and Lippert, who were not afforded any meaningful hearing on their motions, 
Grant was, in fact, afforded a hearing on his attorney's motion. As stated in 
Lippert, the purpose of the inquiry is to make an "assessment into the validity" of 
the defendant's concerns. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 596, 181 P.3d 512, 522. It 
stands to reason then that the nature of the inquiry may vary depending on the 
nature of the defendant's allegations and the specificity with which they are 
made. 
At the hearing, the court inquired about the motion, and Grant's attorney 
explained, "[WJe talked about doing a Rule 11 agreement with the State. 
thought we had an agreement with the State to do that. Come right down to it, 
they would not agree to do a [binding] Rule 11 agreement.... And then my client 
decided that because we couldn't do that, that he would not accept the plea 
offer." (Tr., p. 120, Ls. 11-23.) He later explained, "I think communication has 
broke down. I don't think I can communicate with him." (Tr., p. 124, Ls. 18-20.) 
Grant was present at the hearing and did not dispute his attorney's 
assertions. Thus, unlike the defendants in Lippert and Peck, he was afforded a 
hearing and the court had sufficient information to make an "assessment into the 
validity" of the concerns of Grant and his attorney. 
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Finally, Grant asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied his attorney's motion to withdraw because it ignored the communication 
breakdown between Grant and his attorney. (Appellant's brief, pp. 24-26.) Grant 
is incorrect; a review of the record and applicable law shows that the court 
conducted an adequate inquiry and properly denied the motion. 
An abuse of discretion will be found if the denial of a motion for 
substitution of counsel results in the abridgement of an accused's right to 
counsel. State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6,11,909 P.2d 624, 629 (Ct. App. 1995). It 
follows that an abuse of discretion will be found in the denial of a motion to 
withdraw only if such denial results in the abridgement of an accused's right to 
counsel. The district court was required to conduct a meaningful inquiry to 
determine whether good cause existed to permit withdrawal of Grant's attorney. 
Lippert, 145 Idaho at 596, 181 P.3d at 522. Good cause includes an actual 
conflict of interest, a complete irrevocable breakdown of communication, or an 
irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict. kt 
In U.S. v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1250 (10th Cir. 2002), the Tenth Circuit 
explained that the court must determine whether an attorney-client conflict rises 
to the level of a "total breakdown in communication" or instead whether the 
conflict is insubstantial or a mere disagreement about trial strategy that does not 
require substitution of counsel: 
The types of communication breakdowns that constitute "total 
breakdowns" defy easy definition, and to our knowledge no court or 
commentator has put forth a precise definition. As a general 
matter, however, we believe that to prove a total breakdown in 
communication, a defendant must put forth evidence of a severe 
and pervasive conflict with his attorney or evidence that he had 
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such minimal contact with the attorney that meaningful 
communication was not possible. 
lit Here, there was no evidence of a "severe and pervasive conflict" between 
Grant and his attorney. Rather, the evidence showed that there was "mere 
disagreement about trial strategy," i.e., whether Grant should accept the plea 
agreement. The district court heard argument on the motion and properly 
concluded that just because Grant's attorney had a difference of opinion with 
Grant "with regards to what [Grant's attorney] believes is in [Grant's] best 
interests," that Grant's attorney could still adequately represent Grant. (Tr., p. 
123, L. 14 - p. 125, L. 4.) Further, the district court asked Grant's attorney, 
"you're able to represent his best interest and proceed to trial if you need to, 
aren't you?" (Tr., p. 125, Ls. 8-9.) Rather than responding "no," which would 
have been the logical response had there been a "total breakdown in 
communication," Grant's attorney simply requested the court to set the case for 
trial. (Tr., p. 125, Ls. 10-12.) Because there was no evidence of a "total 
breakdown in communication," the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Grant's attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel. 
III. 
Grant Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Admitting The Victim 
Impact Statement 
A. Introduction 
Grant asserts that the district court erred in refusing to strike portions of 
the victim impact statement because, according to Grant, the statement 
contained inadmissible statements, including the victim's opinion on the 
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character of the defendant, her opinions about the crime, and her opinion about 
the appropriate sentence. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) In support of his argument, 
Grant relies upon Idaho caselaw addressing the contents of victim impact 
statements at sentencing in capital cases rather than cases addressing victim 
impact statements in non-capital cases. Because the authority he relies upon is 
irrelevant to his situation (a non-capital case) and because the content of the 
victim impact statement in his case was appropriate for a non-capital case, he 
has failed to show error. Grant does not even argue that the victim impact 
statement would not be admissible under the relevant (non-capital) case law. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The district court has broad discretion in determining what evidence is to 
be admitted at a sentencing hearing." State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 625, 
851 P.2d 336, 339 (1993) (quoting State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581,583,618 
P.2d 759, 761 (1980». 
C. Grant Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Admitting The 
Victim's Impact Statement 
Article I, section 22(6) of the Idaho Constitution affords victims of crime the 
right "[t]o be heard, upon request, at all criminal justice proceedings considering 
a plea of guilty, sentencing, incarceration or release of the defendant, unless 
manifest injustice would result," and I.C. § 19-5306(1 )(e) codifies that right. A 
"victim" is defined as "an individual who suffers direct or threatened physical, 
financial or emotional harm as a result of the commission of a crime." I.C. § 19-
5306(5)(a). In the context of sentencing, this right to be heard typically is 
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exercised through a verbal or written statement to the sentencing court that is 
either presented at the sentencing hearing or included within the presentence 
investigation report. See, ~, State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 
(1991) (statement included in presentence investigation report); State v. Wickel, 
126 Idaho 578, 580, 887 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App. 1994) (verbal statement at 
sentencing hearing). So long as manifest injustice is avoided, the sentencing 
court has no discretion to exclude a victim impact statement. Idaho Const. art. I, 
§ 22(6); I.C. § 19-5306(1)(e). See also State v. Guerrero, 130 Idaho 311,312, 
940 P.2d 419, 420 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding right of a crime victim to address the 
court at the offender's sentencing hearing is guaranteed by the Idaho 
Constitution and Idaho Code). 
On appeal, Grant asserts that the district court improperly admitted the 
victim impact statement because it included statements that were based on 
unsubstantiated prior bad acts and included "characterizations and opinions 
about the crime, the defendant and the appropriate sentence," which are not 
admissible under State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,573, 199 P.3d 123, 148 (2008). 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 27-31.) Although Grant recognizes that Payne is a death 
penalty case and that historically there has been a "distinction between the use 
of victim impact statements in death penalty and non-death penalty cases" 
(Appellant's brief, p. 31), he nonetheless argues that the distinction is 
"meaningless when viewed in light of the policy underpinnings" of Payne 
(Appellant's brief, p. 31). He is incorrect. The distinction between a death 
penalty case and a non-death penalty case is an important one. As noted by the 
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United States Supreme Court in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987), 
the formal presentation by the state of the opinions of a victim's family members 
about either the brutality or senselessness of the crime or the character of the 
defendant "can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from 
deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the 
defendant." Thus, in capital cases, such evidence is not permissible because "its 
admission creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose 
the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner." ~ at 503, quoted in 
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73,80,90 P.3d 298,305 (2004). 
In a non-capital case, on the other hand, where the sentencing decision is 
made by a judge, the Idaho appellate courts presume that the sentencing court is 
able to ascertain the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information 
and material which is presented to it during the sentencing process. State v. 
Pierce, 100 Idaho 57, 58, 593 P.2d 392, 393 (1979); State v. Bundy, 122 Idaho 
111,113,831 P.2d 953, 955 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Holmes, 104 Idaho 312, 
314, 658 P.2d 983, 985 (Ct. App. 1983). "A sentencing judge may properly 
conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited, either as to kind of 
information considered or the source from which it may come." State v. Wickel, 
126 Idaho 578, 580, 887 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. 
Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991». 
Idaho appellate courts have repeatedly found the restrictions on impact 
statements in Booth inapplicable to non-capital cases. State v. Chapman, 120 
Idaho 466,470,816 P.2d 1023, 1029 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Waddell, 119 
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Idaho 238,242,804 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 
632, 637, 798 P.2d 914, 919 (1990). The Idaho Court of Appeals has also 
refused to apply the holding of Lovelace, which found that impact statements 
advocating a particular sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, to a non-capital 
case. State v. Deisz, 145 Idaho 826,832, 186 P.3d 682,832 (Ct. App. 2008). In 
holding that the contents of victim impact statements violated the defendant's 
rights in State v. Payne, the Idaho Supreme Court cited only capital punishment 
cases. Payne, 146 Idaho at 572-75, 199 P.3d at 147-49. 
Contrary to Grant's assertions on appeal, the victim was within her rights 
to comment on Grant's character and to recommend a sentence. Limitations on 
these rights are limited to capital cases. See State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 
625, 851 P.2d 336, 339 (1993) (noting "I.C. § 19-5306 does not contain any 
limitations which would prevent a victim of a crime, at sentencing, from sharing 
the victim's opinion of the defendant or making a sentencing recommendation."). 
This Court presumes that sentencing judges are "able to sort out truly relevant, 
admissible evidence presented in the form of victim impact statements .... " 
Payne, 146 Idaho at 574, 199 P.3d at 149 (citing Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 81,90 
P.3d at 306). 
There is no indication that the court relied on any inadmissible evidence 
when it sentenced Grant. In fact, Grant does not even explain how the 
purportedly erroneously admitted statements impacted his sentencing. In her 
letter, the victim discussed uncharged misconduct. (2010 PSI, pp. 17-19.2) 
2 Unnumbered pages of the PSI are numbered sequentially. 
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Grant has failed to show how this information affected his sentence. Nor can he 
because the record shows the district court properly focused on the actual crimes 
to which Grant pled guilty in imposing sentence. (Tr., p. 205, L. 17 - p. 215, L. 
14.) In addition, the victim asked that Grant receive a sentence of 10 years fixed, 
and at sentencing orally requested a life sentence. (2010 PSI, p. 19;'Tr., p. 192, 
Ls. 17-21.) The maximum sentence for felony domestic violence is 10 years and 
Grant received a sentence of ten years with five years fixed, which, as discussed 
in sections IV and V, infra, is appropriate given the egregious facts underlying 
Grant's domestic battery conviction. 
The victim impact statement was properly before the court at sentencing. 
Given the presumption that sentencing courts are "able to sort out truly relevant, 
admissible evidence" at sentencing, Grant has failed to show that the district 
court abused its discretion in admitting the victim impact statement in its entirety. 
IV. 
Grant Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When It Ordered The Sentences In His 2009 Cases To Run Consecutively To 
His Sentence In The 2005 Case 
A. Introduction 
Grant asserts that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when 
it ordered the sentence in his 2005 case to run consecutively to the sentences in 
his 2009 cases. (Appellant's brief, pp. 34-39.) Grant asserts that his mental 
health, substance addiction, childhood abuse, familial support, remorse, and 
track record of success in treatment are all mitigating factors that the district court 
failed to adequately consider at sentencing. (Id.) Given the egregiousness of 
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Grant's crimes and his proven inability to succeed on probation, he has failed to 
show the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. lsi 
C. Grant Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Sentencing Discretion 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was 
excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732,736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To 
establish that the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable 
minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the 
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. 
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at401. 
Grant has failed to demonstrate that the sentence he received was an 
abuse of discretion. A sentence of confinement is reasonable if "it appears 
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to 
achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution." 
State v. Dushkin, 124 Idaho 184, 185, 857 P.2d 663, 664 (Ct. App. 1993). A 
sentence need not serve all of the sentencing goals, or weigh each one equally. 
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The district court specifically applied the correct legal standards for 
sentencing and considered the goals of sentencing before pronouncing 
sentence. (Tr., p. 207, Ls. 6-9.) It focused on the factual basis underlying 
Grant's convictions. (Tr., p. 207, Ls. 10-23, p. 211, L. 4 - p. 212, L. 1.) Grant 
was first convicted of aggravated battery in 2006. (R., vol. I, pp. 122-24.) He 
explained that he was involved in a large fight and described what occurred: 
someone ran "over to them with a metal pipe and starts swingin [sic] it so I run 
[sic] over toward them and get rushed by like 4 or 5 guys then I pulled the gun 
out and pointed it to the ground and pulled the trigger, everyone stopped fightin 
[sic] and started running ... " (2006 PSI, p. 4.) The bullets ricocheted and hit the 
victim in the head and chest, requiring over 500 stitches. (2006 PSI, p. 2.) Grant 
admitted that he was under the influence at the time of the shooting. (2006 PSI, 
p. 5.) The district court sentenced Grant to 10 years with four fixed and retained 
jurisdiction. (R., vol. I, pp. 122-24.) After successfully completing his rider, the 
court suspended Grant's sentence and placed him on four years probation. (R., 
vol. I, pp. 126-27.) 
Grant performed abysmally on probation and, in 2009, was charged with 
possession of methamphetamine in case no. CR. 2009-19445-FE (R., vol. I, p. 
211), and with domestic battery, aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of 
a firearm in case no. CR. 2009-19451-FE (R., vol. II, pp. 344-45). Specifically, in 
CR. 2009-19451-FE, the state alleged that Grant committed the crime of 
domestic battery by burning his girlfriend's face repeatedly with a lighted 
cigarette and committed the crime of aggravated assault by holding a gun to her 
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head and threatening to kill her. (R., vol. II, p. 345.) He ultimately pled guilty to 
domestic battery and possession of a controlled substance pursuant to a plea 
agreement with the state. Given these facts, Grant has failed to show that the 
district court abused its discretion in ordering an overall sentence of 20 years 
with nine years fixed. 
Grant claims that the district court abused its discretion in light of his 
mental health issues, his substance abuse issues, his purported remorse, his 
familial support, his claimed success at treatment, and his childhood abuse. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 35-39.) This argument fails to recognize several important 
facts in the record. 
First, Grant asserts that the district court failed to consider his mental 
health status as a mitigating factor. At sentencing his trial counsel referred on 
several occasions to Grant's purported mental health issues, arguing that he had 
not been diagnosed with a mental disorder in 2005 when he committed the first 
felony and that he was not on his medications when he committed the later 
felonies. (Tr., p. 198, L. 1 - p. 199, L. 15.) According to his trial counsel, Grant 
was placed on his medications and stabilized. However, a mental health report 
that was completed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 concluded that Grant's "ability to 
... engage in lawful behavior is not significantly impaired by mental illness 
as much as his ability to stay sober and straight." (Mental Health Report, 
dated 6/9/2010, p. 2 (emphasis added).) His functional impairment due to mental 
illness was considered "low" and his "primary functional impairment appears to 
be due to substance abuse." (Id.) The evaluator concluded that Grant should 
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receive treatment for substance about but, because he failed to meet certain 
statutory factors in his mental health evaluation, no mental health treatment plan 
was prepared. (ld., p. 3.) 
The district court considered Grant's substance abuse and his completion 
of a jail-based treatment program (Tr., p. 206, Ls.12-15), considered the letters of 
support from Grant's family (Tr. p. 206, Ls. 1-7), heard Grant's allocution and his 
purported remorse (Tr. p. 200, L. 15 - p. 203, L. 12), and reviewed the PSI that 
contained information concerning Grant's childhood abuse (Tr., p. 174, Ls. 20-
22). However, despite the court's awareness of these mitigating factors, the 
court focused on Grant's behavior - that he fired a loaded weapon into a fight 
and injured an individual, and that he later purposely burned his girlfriend's face 
with a lighted cigarette. The district court correctly noted that Grant engaged in 
"incredibly reckless behavior" in firing the gun and that he "disregarded [his 
girlfriend] ... as a human being." (Tr., p. 211, Ls. 8-15.) It explained that Grant 
had been given the opportunity for a retained jurisdiction and probation but 
"continued to not follow the rules" and that he was not "willing to comply with 
really what society expect[ed] of [him]." (Tr., p. 212, L. 19 - p. 213, L. 4.) The 
district court also found that there was an "undue risk that [Grant would] commit 
further crime" (Tr., p. 209, Ls. 18-19), and that a "lighter sentence - such as, 
probation or even the Rider Program ... would depreciate the significance of this 
crime" (Tr., p. 210, L. 25 - p. 211, L. 3). 
Grant's overall sentence of 20 years with nine years fixed is not excessive 
under any reasonable view of the facts. He has failed to show that the district 
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court abused its discretion in ordering his aggravated assault sentence to run 
consecutive to his domestic battery and possession of a controlled substance 
sentences. 
V. 
Grant Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When It Denied His Rule 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
Grant asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp. 39-40.) 
Grant has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the appellate court reviews 
the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 
201,203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). A sentencing court is under no obligation to 
modify a legally imposed sentence. State v. Springer, 122 Idaho 544, 545, 835 
P.2d 1355, 1356 (Ct. App. 1992). If a sentence is not excessive when it is 
pronounced, a defendant must show that it is excessive in view of new or 
additional information presented with his motion for reduction of sentence. 
Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840. If a defendant fails to make this 
showing, it cannot be said that denial of a Rule 35 motion by the district court 
represented an abuse of discretion. kl 
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C. Grant Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred When It 
Denied His Rule 35 Motion 
Grant has failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court's order 
denying his Rule 35 motion. Grant's Rule 35 motion asked the court for leniency. 
(R., vol. II, pp. 402-03.) At the hearing on the motion, the only "new information" 
Grant submitted was a letter written by him and two additional letters of support. 
(Tr., p. 221, Ls. 7-11; R., vol. II, p. 404; letter dated 9/23/10 from Grant to court 
and undated letter from mother to court.) After considering the arguments 
asserted by Grant, the district court denied the motion. (Tr., p. 221, L. 12 - p. 
222, L. 24.) 
On appeal, Grant contends that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his Rule 35 motion because his family supported him and because his 
rehabilitation continued to progress during his incarceration. (Appellant's brief, p. 
40.) In denying his motion, the district court noted that "there really isn't anything 
new for the Court to consider in this particular case that I didn't already know 
when I imposed the sentence" (Tr., p. 222, Ls. 3-6) and explained, "I think [Grant] 
has admirable goals. It doesn't really change much about the underlying facts in 
this particular case or why I imposed the sentence that I did. Society needs to be 
protected first and foremost" (Tr., p. 221, Ls. 12-17). The district court 
concluded, 
Is it a harsh sentence? Not when you really consider the facts and 
circumstances of the case and the opportunities that not only Judge 
McDermott, from this Court, gave him, but the chances he has had 
in life. He just hasn't followed through. He hasn't taken it as 
seriously as he should have, and he put himself and others in great 
peril and jeopardy when he acted the way he did in the domestic 
violence case. 
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Quite frankly, if released on probation or even parole in less 
time that what I imposed here, I really feel like he would go back to 
the same things he has done before and, quite frankly, put people 
at risk. 
(Tr., p. 222, Ls. 7-22.) Given any reasonable view of the facts, Grant has failed 
to establish that the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 
motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Woodrow John 
Grant's convictions and sentences. 
DATED this 20th day of January, 2012. 
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